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Abstract
Nowadays, the increasingly growing number of mobile
and computing devices has led to a demand for safer user
authentication systems. Face anti-spoofing is a measure to-
wards this direction for bio-metric user authentication, and
in particular face recognition, that tries to prevent spoof
attacks. The state-of-the-art anti-spoofing techniques lever-
age the ability of deep neural networks to learn discrimina-
tive features, based on cues from the training set images or
video samples, in an effort to detect spoof attacks. However,
due to the particular nature of the problem, i.e. large vari-
ability due to factors like different backgrounds, lighting
conditions, camera resolutions, spoof materials, etc., these
techniques typically fail to generalize to new samples. In
this paper, we explicitly tackle this problem and propose a
class-conditional domain discriminator module, that, cou-
pled with a gradient reversal layer, tries to generate live
and spoof features that are discriminative, but at the same
time robust against the aforementioned variability factors.
Extensive experimental analysis shows the effectiveness of
the proposed method over existing image- and video-based
anti-spoofing techniques, both in terms of numerical im-
provement as well as when visualizing the learned features.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, people use computing devices, such as lap-
tops and smartphones, to work, pay their bills, purchase
things as well as interact with their social circle, entertain
themselves, etc. Given the constant use we make of these
Live 
Print
Attack
Oulu-NPU Idiap RACASIA
Replay
Attack
Video
MSU
Figure 1. Sample frames from the four publicly available face
anti-spoofing datasets: CASIA-MFSD [68], MSU-MFSD [63],
Oulu-NPU [9] and Idiap Replay-Attack (RA) [13]. Note that, a
large variability can be observed due to factors like different attack
instruments, backgrounds, lighting conditions, camera resolutions
etc. resulting significant domain shift among these datasets.
devices, it is important to develop convenient, yet secure,
ways to log into them. Lately, bio-metric authentication,
and in particular face recognition, has emerged as an attrac-
tive way of user identification due to the unique nature of
each individual’s face in combination with the ease-of-use
of this approach (e.g. Apple’s FaceID). At the same time,
however, hackers have become more inventive in their at-
tempts to spoof someone’s face in order to fool the authenti-
cation system. Typical examples include printing one’s face
picture on paper (print attack), playing a video depicting
the person’s face on another device (replay attack), wear-
ing a special mask to closely imitate someone’s facial ap-
pearance (mask attack), etc. Understandably, being able to
effectively detect such attacks, formally known as face anti-
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spoofing (FAS), is a critical problem in computer vision.
On the one hand, traditional approaches to face anti-
spoofing rely on hand-crafted features, like LBP [13, 15,
16], HoG [30, 67] and SURF [8], to detect differences
in texture between the live and spoof face images, or
heuristics, like eyeblink [46], lip motion [29], and visual
rhythms [50], to identify regularities that are absent from
the spoof attacks. However, the aforementioned methods
are either not applicable to all possible spoof attacks, i.e.
print, replay, and mask, or they fail to generalize to dif-
ferent datasets, since the learned features specialize to the
‘trained’ textures, which largely vary between datasets due
to factors like different backgrounds, lighting conditions,
camera resolutions, spoof materials, etc. as can be seen in
Fig. 1.
On the other hand, modern approaches use convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs) [66, 38, 47, 2, 42, 27] that
have shown impressive performance in many computer vi-
sion tasks, largely attributed to the great representational
power of their learned features when trained on large-scale
datasets. Despite the improved performance, there are still
open challenges in FAS. A notable one is the domain1
shift [36] problem. The latter occurs when a network trained
on one dataset (source domain) is tested on a completely un-
seen dataset (target domain). This is referred to as “cross-
testing” in the FAS literature, while training and testing on
the same dataset is referred to as “intra-testing”. The ex-
isting deep learning based approaches show promising re-
sults for intra-testing, but their performance dramatically
degrades when evaluated under a cross-testing setup [52].
The main reason for this performance drop is the feature
distribution dissimilarity (see Fig. 2) between the source
and target domains caused by several dataset specific cues,
such as differences in: (1) environmental conditions (illumi-
nation, background), (2) spoofing mediums (printers, dis-
play screens), and (3) the quality of video capturing devices
(different mobile phones, tablets). Thus, a model learns to
differentiate between live and spoof samples based on these
dataset dependent cues, but fails to correctly classify sam-
ples from unknown datasets having different sets of cues.
In this paper, we address the aforementioned domain
shift problem in FAS under the domain generalization set-
ting. That is, the network is trained on multiple datasets
(source domains), but then tested on a completely unseen
dataset (target domain). Our goal is to generate domain ag-
nostic feature representations using the source domain sam-
ples that would generalize to the unseen target domain sam-
ples, so that each sample, regardless of its domain origin,
can effectively be classified as live or spoof. To this end,
we propose the use of class-conditional domain discrimi-
nator modules coupled with a gradient reversal layer [20].
The former take the feature representations generated from
1The term domain in this paper is used to refer to a dataset.
a backbone network, and try to classify from which source
domain each sample comes, conditioned on the class it be-
longs (i.e. live or spoof). The latter acts as an identity trans-
form during the forward propagation, but multiplies the gra-
dient by a certain negative constant during the backward
propagation, essentially reversing the objective of its sub-
sequent layers. In our case, this practically means that the
backbone network is now tasked with the extra objective
of generating live and spoof feature representations that are
indistinguishable across domains. Note that, our method
works for both image-based and video-based inputs, but we
explicitly avoid to include extra components as input, like
depth [2] or rPPG signals [42], as the latter would require
expensive ground truth labels in order to train the network.
Our key contributions can be summarized as: (1) a class-
conditional domain discriminator module (§ 3.3) which
coupled with a gradient reversal layer promotes the learn-
ing of domain agnostic features; (2) an LSTM network
(§ 3.2,3.5) to learn temporal domain agnostic features as
complementary information; (3) state-of-the-art results on
the four challenging domain generalization test sets (§ 4.2)
with an accompanying visual analysis of the feature embed-
ding (§ 4.4) and class activation maps (§ 4.6).
2. Related work
In what follows, we describe traditional, feature-based
as well as modern, CNN-based approaches to FAS. We then
elaborate on the few domain generalization works on FAS.
Traditional approaches Before the advent of
CNNs [32], typical approaches to face anti-spoofing
combined the use of hand-crafted features with shal-
low classification techniques to detect differences in
texture between the live and spoof images. The most
characteristic examples of hand-crafted features include
LBP [43, 13, 15, 16], HoG [30, 67], DoG [59, 49],
SIFT [48], and SURF [8]. As for the classifier, these works
rely on SVM and, to a lesser degree, on LDA. In a similar
vein, other traditional approaches employed heuristics to
leverage ‘liveliness’ cues that are not present in a spoof
attack. Examples of such heuristics are eyeblink [46, 57],
lip motion [29], visual rhythms [50], Haralick texture
features [1], audio [12, 11], dynamic textures [17], or oth-
ers [59, 40, 41]. Another way to address face anti-spoofing
is to make use of temporal cues in videos, for example,
Bharadwaj et al. [5] tried to use motion magnification to
enhance facial expressions, while [31] tried using motion
and texture cues. To account for factors of variation in
the compared images, such as illumination, pose, etc., the
use of different color spaces (HSV, YCbCr) [6, 7], image
distortion analysis [63], or a transformation to the temporal
domain [3, 55] and Fourier spectrum [37], have been
explored. In general, these traditional methods are either
not applicable to all possible spoof attacks, i.e. print, replay,
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Figure 2. A t-SNE visualization of CNN features from a ResNet50 backbone trained on multiple source domains (i.e. FAS datasets) and
tested on an unseen target domain. For better visualization we show only one source and one target domain in these plots. We can easily
recognize the inherent domain shift problem in face anti-spoofing. That is, the live and spoof samples from the source and target domains
are not properly aligned in the feature space, resulting in poor generalization of the learned feature representations on the target domain.
mask, or they fail to generalize to different datasets, since
the learned features specialize to the ’trained’ textures,
which largely vary between datasets due to factors of
variation like different backgrounds, lighting conditions,
camera resolutions, spoof materials, etc.
CNN-based approaches The impressive results
achieved by applying CNNs to the tasks of image classi-
fication and object recognition [32, 24, 56, 58] motivated
researchers to employ them to other computer vision tasks
too. Face anti-spoofing is no exception. The obvious choice
is to replace the hand-crafted features with features learned
from generic CNNs - known for their great representational
power when trained on large-scale datasets - which is what
was done in [47, 38]. Differently, Yang et al. [66] used a
CNN as a binary classifier, to assign live/spoof labels to
the input images. They used a multi-scale pyramid of the
RGB images as input, whereas Feng et al. [18] explored
the use of multiple cues, such as image quality and motion
cues. Next, Xu et al. [64] incorporated video inputs and
proposed an LSTM-CNN model to take advantage of the
information from the extra frames. Dynamic textures were
proposed in [53, 54] to extract different facial motions. Re-
cently, Atoum et al. [2] introduced a multitasking-inspired
approach that combines the estimation of texture and depth
features for binary live/spoof classification, which was
later extended by Liu et al. [42] to also include fusion
with temporal supervision, i.e. rPPG signals. Finally,
Joorabloo et al. [27] followed a different path and inversely
decomposed a spoof face into a spoof noise and a live face
using a GAN architecture, and consequently utilized the
spoof noise for classification. Bresan et al. [10] explore
depth, salience and illumination maps associated with a
pre-trained CNN for FAS. They use combination of source
domains (i.e. NUAA [59], Idiap Replay-Attack [13],
CASIA-MFSD [68] dataset), different from ours, and thus
their method is not directly comparable.
The aforementioned works, despite showing improved
performance, partially attributed to the use of CNNs, still
face open challenges when it comes to generalizing across
domains (i.e. datasets). As mentioned, there is an inherent
domain shift [36] between the different FAS datasets (e.g.
Replay Attack [13] and CASIA-FASD [68]), which in turn
leads to poor cross-testing results. In this paper, we go be-
yond current CNN-based approaches and explicitly tackle
the domain shift problem in FAS without relying on su-
pervision from extra cues, like depth or rPPG signals, that
would require a significant annotation effort to acquire.
Domain generalization approaches. To tackle the do-
main shift problem across different datasets, domain adap-
tation [25, 19, 62, 20, 21] and generalization [28, 45, 65,
23, 22, 33, 44, 35] techniques have been used in computer
vision. The goal in each case is to bridge the distribution
gap between data from source and target domains in order
to create domain agnostic feature representations that gen-
eralize to new domains. In this paper, we are mostly in-
terested in domain generalization techniques, which have
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been largely unexploited in FAS, with the following ex-
ceptions. Li et al. [34] encouraged the learning of gen-
eralized feature representations by taking both spatial and
temporal information into consideration and minimizing a
cross-entropy loss together with a generalization loss. Tu et
al. [61] proposed the use of Total Pairwise Confusion loss
for CNN training in conjunction with a Fast Domain Adap-
tation component into the CNN model to account for do-
main changes. Shao et al. [52] combined the learning a
generalized feature space that is shared by multiple discrim-
inative source domains with dual-force triplet mining con-
straint to improve the discriminability of the learned feature
space. In general, compared to the aforementioned works
our framework offers better integration to multiple domains,
and, as will be shown in Sec. 4, achieves significantly im-
proved results on four public datasets.
3. Proposed Approach
3.1. The domain shift problem in face anti-spoofing
Our main goal is to learn generalized feature representa-
tions in order to address the domain shift problem that in-
herently exists among FAS datasets. That is, the distribution
dissimilarities between live and spoof samples that belong
to multiple source and unseen target domains. To illustrate
this problem, we use t-SNE plots (Fig. 2) generated from the
CNN features of a ResNet50 [26] backbone trained on mul-
tiple source domains (i.e. FAS datasets) for live/spoof clas-
sification, and tested on an unseen target domain. As can be
seen in Fig. 2 (a), the CNN features of the live samples from
the unseen target domain are far away from the live samples
of the source domain in the feature space. Similarly in Fig. 2
(b), we can see that the print attack features from the target
domain are far apart from the source domain’s print attacks,
and the target domain’s replay attack features are shifted
towards the live samples of the source domain. It is quiet
evident from these illustrations that even deep neural net-
works, like ResNet models, are not sufficient on their own
to tackle the problem. This calls for dedicated mechanisms
that can leverage the common attributes shared across mul-
tiple source domains to learn more generic feature represen-
tations. The term common attributes is used here to refer to
the common intrinsic properties of the print and replay at-
tacks across multiple domains. For example, although these
attacks might have been generated using different spoofing
mediums (i.e. different printers or video capturing devices),
or under different environmental conditions (e.g. illumina-
tion, background scene), they are inherently based on pa-
per materials or display screens. Thus, by leveraging these
common attributes one could expect that better feature rep-
resentations can be learned from the shared and discrimi-
native information across multiple source domains, that is
robust for live/spoofing classification and at the same time
domain agnostic. We expect such representations to demon-
strate better generalization on unseen target domains.
3.2. System overview
To tackle the aforementioned problem, we propose a
novel framework which learns both image- and video-based
domain agnostic feature representations (see Fig. 3). More
specifically, a ResNet backbone (encoder) is trained to min-
imize the live/spoof classification loss, while at the same
time it competes against a class-conditional domain dis-
criminator (§3.3) coupled with a gradient reversal layer to
maximize the domain classification loss of live and spoof
samples respectively. During the training process the en-
coder gradually learns the shared and discriminative feature
representations. A system overview is given in Fig. 3.
You can observe two variations (see Fig. 3). First, an
image based (IB) network that follows an image-level train-
ing, in which a training example consists of an image and
its associated ground-truth label (either “live” or “spoof”).
This is to demonstrate the scenario where only a single im-
age is given as input, and the system has to decide if this
is a spoof attack or not. However, FAS can also be a video
classification problem, i.e. we expect the final output to
be a live/spoof label for an input video sample. Thus, a
CNN trained following an image-level protocol might fail
if we process the results on a frame-by-frame basis, as the
video itself usually contains richer information. For such
instances, we want the network to learn strong temporal
features which are complementary to the spatial represen-
tation learned by the IB network. Based on this idea, we
also propose a video-based (VB) network which is trained
along-side the IB network, following an alternating train-
ing scheme [42]. This VB network uses the same ResNet
backbone, i.e. model parameters of the ResNet backbone
are shared between the IB and VB networks. Unlike the
IB network, the VB network inputs video sequence and
processes these through multiple long-short term memory
(LSTM) units and outputs a single class label for each input
video sequence.
3.3. Class-conditional domain discriminator
In Fig. 3 (c), we show the network architecture of our
proposed class-conditional domain discriminator (CCDD).
CCDD consists of two fully connected layers, FC1 and FC2,
followed by a live and a spoof head. FC1 and FC2 layers
are followed by a ReLU and a dropout layer. During train-
ing, an SGD mini-batch that consists of live and spoof train-
ing examples is processed through the FC1 and FC2 layers.
Consequently, the outputs of the FC2 layer are first split into
“live” and “spoof” batches, and then, they are passed as in-
put to their respective heads. The live and spoof heads have
the same layer configuration, i.e. each consists of a single
linear transformation layer followed by a domain classifier.
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Figure 3. Overview of the different components of the proposed approach. See Section 3 for more details.
They output two score vectors sl and sf having D scores,
i.e. the softmax probability scores for each domain. Note
that, we use the same network architecture for the image-
and video-based CCDD (DIB and DVB in Fig.3 (a) & (b)).
The proposed CCDD coupled with the gradient reversal
layer imposes the desired conditional invariance property on
the learned feature representations. The conditional invari-
ance is realized by the class-conditional losses (see below),
which consider the source domain label information only
and aim to make the representation in each class indistin-
guishable across domains. We present a t-SNE visualiza-
tion (§4.4) to demonstrate that the proposed CCDD learns
to correctly align the live and spoof features of the target
domain with the features of source domains. Besides, we
present quantitative experimental results to attest the effec-
tiveness of the CCDD. A more detailed network design is
provided in A.1.
3.4. Gradient reversal layer
The gradient reversal layer (GRL) [20] was originally
proposed for unsupervised domain adaptation. Instead, we
couple CCDD with GRL in order to learn domain agnostic
features from multiple source domains for FAS. In partic-
ular, we use two GRL layers, one in the image-based and
another one in the video-based network (Fig.3). What GRL
essentially does, is to reverse the gradient by multiplying it
by a negative scalar (i.e. the adaptation factor λGRL) during
the backward propagation. During the forward propagation,
it leaves the input unchanged, i.e. it acts as an identity trans-
form. By doing so, it essentially reverses the objective of its
subsequent layers, i.e. CCDD in our case. What this prac-
tically means, is that the backbone network is now tasked
with the extra objective of generating live and spoof fea-
ture representations that are indistinguishable across multi-
ple source domains.
3.5. Optimization cost
First, we specify the energy function used to optimize
the IB network (Fig.3 (a)). Consider the following nota-
tions: θf , θl and θs be the model parameters of the com-
mon layers (i.e. FC1 & FC2), live and spoof heads of the
DIB respectively; θe and θc be the model parameters of the
encoder (i.e. the ResNet backbone) and the label classi-
fier (i.e. the live/spoof classifier); Ll and Ls be the domain
classification losses (i.e. multinomial) for the live and spoof
heads that penalize for incorrect domain label prediction
separately for the “live” and “spoof” training examples; Lc
be the label classification (e.g. multinomial) loss that pe-
nalizes for incorrect class label (i.e. “live” or “spoof”) pre-
diction; i denotes the index for a training example and F
be the number of training examples, i.e. i = {1, 2, . . . , F};
bi be a binary variable denoting the class label of the i-th
example, i.e. bi = 0 indicates that the example is live and
bi = 1 that it is a spoof. During the IB network training,
the encoder’s model parameters θe learn to minimize the
discrepancy in the class conditional distribution [39] across
different domains. This is done by maximizing the domain
classification losses of the live and spoof heads of the DIB.
In other words, it tries to make the feature distributions (be-
longing to a class c ∈ C) maximally similar across different
domains. At the same time, the live and spoof heads seek
parameters θl and θs which minimize the class conditional
domain classification losses. This yields as energy function
for our IB network:
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Table 1. Comparison to state-of-the-art FAS methods on four domain generalization test sets.
Method O&C&I→M O&M&I→C O&C&M→I I&C&M→OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
MS LBP [43] 29.76 78.50 54.28 44.98 50.30 51.64 50.29 49.31
Binary CNN [66] 29.25 82.87 34.88 71.94 34.47 65.88 29.61 77.54
IDA [63] 66.67 27.86 55.17 39.05 28.35 78.25 54.20 44.59
Color Texture [7] 28.09 78.47 30.58 76.89 40.40 62.78 63.59 32.71
LBPTOP [17] 36.90 70.80 42.60 61.05 49.45 49.54 53.15 44.09
Auxiliary(Depth Only) [42] 22.72 85.88 33.52 73.15 29.14 71.69 30.17 77.61
Auxiliary(All) [42] - - 28.4 - 27.6 - - -
Ours 15.42 91.13 17.41 90.12 15.87 91.72 14.72 93.08
Table 2. Comparison to state-of-the-art domain generalization FAS methods on four domain generalization test sets.
Method O&C&I→M O&M&I→C O&C&M→I I&C&M→OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
MMD-AAE [35] 27.08 83.19 44.59 58.29 31.58 75.18 40.98 63.08
MADDG [52] 17.69 88.06 24.5 84.51 22.19 84.99 27.98 80.02
Ours 15.42 91.13 17.41 90.12 15.87 91.72 14.72 93.08
E(θe, θc, θf , θl, θs) =
∑
i=1...F
Lic(θe, θc)
− λIB
( ∑
i=1...F
b=0
Lil(θe, θf , θl) +
∑
i=1...F
b=1
Lis(θe, θf , θs)
)
(1)
Now, we specify the energy function used to optimize
the VB network (Fig.3 (b)). Let: θˆr be the model param-
eters of the LSTM network; θˆf , θˆl and θˆs be the model
parameters of the common layers (i.e. FC1 & FC2), live
and spoof heads of the video-based class-conditional do-
main discriminator respectively; θˆc be the model parame-
ters of the LSTM’s label classifier (i.e. the live/spoof clas-
sifier). In a similar fashion, during the VB network training
the encoder’s and LSTM’s model parameters (i.e. θe and
θˆr) learn to minimize the discrepancy in the class condi-
tional distribution across different domains by maximizing
the domain classification losses of the live and spoof heads
of the DVB. At the same time, the live and spoof heads seek
parameters θˆl and θˆs which minimize the class conditional
domain classification losses. This yields as energy function
for our VB network:
E(θe, θˆr, θˆc, θˆf , θˆl, θˆs) =
∑
i=1...F
Lˆ
i
c(θe, θˆr, θˆc)
− λV B
( ∑
i=1...F
b=0
Lˆ
i
l(θe, θˆr, θˆf , θˆl) +
∑
i=1...F
b=1
Lˆ
i
s(θe, θˆr, θˆf , θˆs)
)
(2)
Lˆ
i
c, Lˆ
i
l and Lˆ
i
s are the live/spoof classification loss and
the domain classification losses (for the live and spoof
heads) for VB network. λIB and λV B are the scalar pa-
rameters weighting the relative importance of the two loss
terms in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 respectively. Note that, the en-
coder’s model parameters θe are shared across the image-
and video-based networks.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental setting
Datasets. We evaluate our method on four publicly
available FAS datasets: Oulu-NPU [9] (O for short),
CASIA-MFSD [68] (C for short), Idiap Replay-Attack [13]
(I for short), and MSU-MFSD [63] (M for short).
Training and evaluation. We consider a dataset to be
one domain in our experiments. Our model learns domain
generalized representations from three out of four datasets,
as in [52]. In particular, we randomly select three datasets
as the source domains, and the remaining unseen domain,
which is not accessed during training, is kept for evaluation
only. Half Total Error Rate (HTER) [4] and Area Under
Curve (AUC) are used as the evaluation metrics in our ex-
periments.
Implementation details. We use ResNet-50 [26] as our
backbone network. The dimension of the input image is
224×224. During training, we use SGD optimizer, and fol-
low an alternative training approach [42] to train both our IB
and VB networks (Fig. 3). We use a constant learning rate
of 0.0003, momentum 0.9 and weight decay 0.00001. The
mini-batch size for the IB network is 48, i.e. 16 training im-
ages from each of the three domains. For the VB network,
the mini-batch size is 6, i.e. 2 training video sequences from
each of the three source domains, and the LSTM sequence
length is 8. The LSTM’s input dimension is 2048, while
the hidden layer dimension is 256. We use a constant GRL
adaptation factor (λGRL = 0.2) [20], and set the λIB and
λV B to 1. Additional experimental details are presented in
A.2.
4.2. Comparison to the state-of-the-art
In Table 1, we compare our full model against state-
of-the-art FAS methods. Our proposed method outper-
forms [43, 66, 63, 7, 17, 42] on all the four domain gen-
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Figure 4. A t-SNE plot of the CNN features coming from ResNet (a) vs our full model (b,c), both trained on three source domains
and tested on an unseen target domain (best viewed in color). Note that, the live features of source and target domains are far apart (a);
similar trend can be noticed for the spoof features of source and target domain, but our model learns to group together all live and spoof
features (from multiple source domains) into two different clusters (b), thus improving the classification accuracy. Importantly, the learned
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Table 3. An ablation study of the different components in the proposed FAS architecture on four domain generalization test sets.
ResNet DIB LSTM DVB O&C&I→M O&M&I→C O&C&M→I I&C&M→OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
X 21.66 89.64 25.92 82.16 20.12 90.1 18.81 89.53
X X 18.33 90.58 21.29 85.82 17.63 86.3 17.05 90.01
X X 17.92 90.27 19.26 87.85 18.0 89.78 16.42 90.82
X X X 18.33 88.25 21.11 88.22 18.25 85.61 17.05 91.09
X X X 14.58 92.58 18.7 89.35 15.13 95.76 14.86 93.00
X X X X 15.42 91.13 17.41 90.12 15.87 91.87 14.72 93.08
eralization test sets. The significantly better performance
mostly lies in the ability to learn rich generalizable features,
which adapt well to the unseen target domain (see Fig.4).
Note that, these FAS methods do not explicitly address the
domain shift problem, and thus naturally fail to general-
ize well on unseen target domains. In contrast, our pro-
posed method explicitly learns a generalizable representa-
tion by leveraging the available information (live and spoof
examples with ground truth labels) from multiple source do-
mains. In particular, it learns to map all the live and spoof
samples (from multiple source domains) to a common fea-
ture space where the live and spoof features are far apart,
while being domain invariant at the same time.
In addition, we compare against the state-of-the-art do-
main generalization FAS method [52] and also compare to
the related state-of-the-art method in domain generalization
for the face anti-spoofing task: MMD-AAE [35] as in [52].
These methods explicitly address the domain shift problem.
Table 2 shows this comparison, where our method consis-
tently achieves much better performance. We conclude that
the proposed method can overcome the distribution dissimi-
larities in the feature space more effectively. Moreover, [52]
is relatively expensive and not end-to-end trainable, in con-
trast to our method.
4.3. Ablation study on model components
So far, we have shown results with our full model that
contains all the different components, i.e. ResNet back-
bone (ResNet), image-level domain discriminator (DIB),
LSTM module (LSTM), and video-level domain discrim-
inator (DVB). In what follows, we present a detailed abla-
tion study when using different combinations of these com-
ponents. The experimental results on all four domain gen-
eralization test sets are summarized in Table 3.
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model
components, we first setup our own baseline for the ab-
lation study. The baseline is comprised of a ResNet-50
trained on the four different domain generalization train-
ing sets. Our baseline itself exhibits some desirable perfor-
mance. In A.3, we report experiments with a lighter back-
bone as in [42]. When adding DIB on top of the ResNet
backbone, the results are consistently improved on all four
test sets. Additionally adding LSTM, the results are again
improved significantly. Finally, our full model boosts the
results further on the two most challenging domain general-
ization test sets (O&M&I→C and I&C&M→O). Combin-
ing ResNet and LSTM, provides slightly better results on
three test setups compared to the model using ResNet and
DIB. However, adding DVB to the model with ResNet and
LSTM does not bring any further improvements. Instead, it
slightly degrades the performance. On the positive side, this
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latter model jointly trained with DIB, i.e. our full model,
shows consistent improvements over the ResNet baseline.
This observation verifies that both DIB as well as LSTM
and DVB help the network to learn domain agnostic feature
representations for FAS.
4.4. Visualization of the learned CNN features
Fig. 4 depicts t-SNE plots of the CNN activations (i.e.
features) coming from our ResNet baseline vs our full
model. Both networks were trained on 3 source do-
mains (i.e. Oulu-NPU, CASIA-MFSD and MSU-MFSD)
and tested on a target domain (i.e. Idiap replay-attack). Note
that, the plots in (b) and (c) are generated using the same
trained model, i.e. our full model, and the same set of
live and spoof samples. For the sake of better visualiza-
tion, however, we have deactivated the visualization of the
target domain in (b). As can be seen in (b), our model
learns more discriminative features for live and spoof im-
ages. What is more interesting is that the representation
learned by our model aligns well with unseen target do-
main’s live and spoof features, as can be seen by activat-
ing the target domain visualization in (c). In contrast, the
ResNet learnt representation shows relatively weaker gener-
alization ability on the target domain, as shown in (a). In the
latter case, the live, print- and replay-attack features from
multiple source domains are far apart in the feature space,
whereas our model learns to minimize this inter-domain dis-
tances between live and spoof features, as shown in (b, c).
From these visualizations, we can conclude that our net-
work generalizes well on the target domain. Particularly
observe in (c) how the target domain live and spoof features
are properly aligned with the live and spoof features of the
source domains in (b).
ClassifierDomainFC-1
Domain Disciminator (Dis) 
FC-3FC-2ReLUDropout
ReLU
Dropout
Figure 5. Architectural components of our default Domain Dis-
criminator network (Dis).
(a) Live (b) Print attack (c) Video attack
Figure 6. Activation map visualization of the proposed network.
For each column (a), (b) and (c), the original input images and its
associated network class activation maps are shown.
Table 4. Performance comparison of different domain discrimina-
tors on three domain generalization test sets.
ResNet Dis DIB
S&O&I&R S&O&C&R S&C&I&R
→C →I →O
HTER(%) HTER(%) ACER(%)
X 17.5 20.6 10.27
X X 15.3 17.7 8.75
X X X 15.1 17.0 23.4
X X 14.0 14.7 8.05
4.5. Impact of different domain discriminators
We conduct experiments to analyze the effect of using
different domain discriminators on the FAS performance.
We consider two domain discriminator architectures: the
proposed DIB (Fig. 3), and the default domain classifier
(Fig. 5) originally proposed by [20] for unsupervised do-
main adaptation (Dis in Table 4). Note that, for the ex-
periments in this section we used – only for training pur-
poses – two more datasets, i.e. SiW (S for short) [42]
and Idiap replay-mobile (R for short) [14]. Following [42],
when testing on Oulu-NPU dataset, we use the ACER met-
ric. From Table 4, it can be seen that our ResNet-DIB gives
the best performance. When ResNet-Dis is used, the perfor-
mance degrades slightly. Even combining Dis with DIB de-
grades the performance heavily on Oulu-NPU. From these
experiments, we observe that learning feature representa-
tions from multiple source domains conditioned on class
labels (i.e. live and spoof) can provide discriminative and
domain agnostic features, while conditioning them on do-
main labels only may not correctly align the live and spoof
features, resulting poor classification accuracy. As the pro-
posed DIB has access to both class (live and spoof) and do-
main labels, in contrast to Dis, it is able to learn better repre-
sentations by correctly grouping live features from multiple
source domain into one cluster and spoof features into an-
other (see Fig. 4).
4.6. Class activation map visualization
In this section, we provide a visual analysis of the class
activation maps to get an intuition about the decisions the
network makes when making a particular prediction. For
this visualization, we use the Grad-CAM [51] technique.
In Fig. 6 we show the class activation maps for the live,
print and replay attack test samples. Some interesting ob-
servations can be made. The network gives more impor-
tance to the facial regions for detecting a “live” class (see
Fig. 6 (a)) which is intuitive as most of the information
about a live face comes from the facial region. For exam-
ple, the texture of a live skin, the eye blinking, head motion
etc. On the other hand, for print attacks the network pays
more attention to the surface of the paper (on which the face
image is printed) (Fig. 6 (b)). For video replay attacks, if
strong features like “a hand in the background” and “a tablet
screen” are present then the network takes decision from
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these salient information (Fig. 6 (c) top). In the absence of
such strong features, it tries to see both the facial region and
the background (Fig. 6 (c) bottom).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed an inherent problem in
face anti-spoofing, i.e. the large variability in factors
such as the different backgrounds, lighting conditions,
camera resolutions, spoof materials, etc., makes feature
representations learned by CNNs for this task too domain-
dependent, leading to decreased performance when testing
on unseen domains. We propose a solution based on gen-
eralizable feature learning that naturally fits this ’domain
shift’ problem in both image-based and video-based face
anti-spoofing. We provide extensive experimentation on
multiple aspects of our approach, and among others, we
demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across different
test sets, we illustrate the qualitative improvement of the
learned feature representations w.r.t. generalization, and
visualize through the class activation maps the network’s
attention when making predictions. For future work, we
would like to use multi-modal inputs and apply domain
agnostic multi-modal feature learning to further improve
the classification accuracy.
A. Appendix
A.1. Detailed network design
In this section, we present a detailed architectural de-
sign of the proposed network. We use the ResNet-50 as
our backbone network and PyTorch for implementation pur-
pose. In Table 5, we show the layer-wise network design
of our proposed Class-conditional Domain Discriminator
(CCDD) and the live/spoof classifier (LSC). Note that, the
ResNet-50 backbone inputs a 224× 224 image and outputs
a 2048 dimensional feature vector which is passed as the in-
put to both the CCDD and LSC. The FC31 and FC32 layers
(i.e. the live and spoof heads) of CCDD output 3 softmax
probability scores for the 3 source domains. The FC2 (or
final) layer of the LSC outputs 2 softmax probability scores
for the 2 class labels - “live” and “spoof”.
The shape of the input tensor to the LSTM network is
[T × B × 2048] where T is the sequence length and B is
the SGD mini-batch size. We set T and B to 8 and 2 re-
spectively. For each time step t, the LSTM outputs 256
dimensional feature vector, where t = 1, 2, ..., 8. These 8
feature vectors are concatenated to a single feature vector of
dim. 2048 which is then passed as input to the LSC.
A.2. Additional experimental details
We use four domain generalization datasets as in [52]
which are created from the following publicly available
face anti-spoofing datasets: Oulu-NPU [9] (O for short),
CASIA-MFSD [68] (C for short), Idiap Replay-Attack [13]
(I for short), and MSU-MFSD [63] (M for short). In Ta-
ble 6, we present the training, validation and test set details
for each of these four datasets. CASIA-MFSD and MSU-
MFSD don’t have validation sets and following the standard
practice, we use a subset of the training set as the valida-
tion set for both of these datasets. At inference time, we
receive the predictions from both image- and video-based
live/spoof classifiers (see Fig. 3). As a final output, we
select the one which gives the best performance on the val-
idation set. We initialize the ResNet-50 backbone with Im-
ageNet [32] pretrained weights.
A.3. Experimental results with smaller backbone
In this section, we present our experimental results with a
smaller backbone (i.e. ResNet-18) compared to the ResNet-
50 used in Section 4. We replace the ResNet-50 backbone
in our proposed framework with ResNet-18 and train the
model. In Table 7, we show that even if our proposed frame-
work uses a weaker backbone network, it shows consistent
improvements on the four challenging domain generaliza-
tion test sets. Note that, I&C&M→O has the smallest train-
ing set among these four domain generalization datasets
(Table 6). For this smaller dataset, our proposed framework
achieves better performance with a ResNet-18 backbone.
A.3.1 Assessing the model’s generalizability
To assess the model’s generalization ability, we increase the
number of source domains. By doing so, we allow the net-
work to see live and spoof examples with large variations
in subjects, environmental conditions, attack instruments,
video capturing devices, etc. One may argue that in this case
the improvements merely come by adding more data. To
ensure this is not the case, we also compare results against
the ResNet baseline on the same data. As shown in Ta-
ble 8, our imaged based network (DIB) achieves consistent
improvements over the ResNet baseline, on three different
domain generalization test settings. Note that, for the ex-
periments in this section we used – only for training pur-
poses – two more datasets, i.e. SiW (S for short) [42] and
Idiap replay-mobile (R for short) [14]. Although, further
improvements can be achieved by adding the video based
network (LSTM and DVB), here we demonstrate improve-
ments only in image-based FAS and exclude the video-
based case. Following [42], when testing on Oulu-NPU
dataset, we use the ACER metric and report results (in Ta-
ble 8) by averaging the ACERs over the four test protocols.
A.4. Domain adaptation experiments
In this section, we compare the face anti-spoofing perfor-
mance of our proposed approach with the existing domain
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Table 5. The architectural details of the proposed network.
CCDD (Class-conditional Domain Discriminator) Live/Spoof Classifier
Layer Input Dim. Output Dim. Layer Input Dim. Output Dim.
FC1 2048 1024 FC1 2048 512
ReLU ReLU
Dropout Dropout
FC2 1024 1024 FC2 512 2 (num. class labels)
ReLU
Dropout
FC31 (Live Head) 1024 3 (num. source domains)
FC32 (Spoof Head) 1024 3 (num. source domains)
Table 6. Domain generalization training, validation and test sets used in this work.
Dataset Name Training Set Validation Set Test Set
O&C&I→M Training sets from Oulu-NPU, Validation sets from Oulu-NPU, MSU-MFSD test set
CASIA-MFSD and Idiap Replay-Attack. CASIA-MFSD and Idiap Replay-Attack.
O&M&I→C Training sets from Oulu-NPU, Validation sets from Oulu-NPU, CASIA-MFSD test set
MSU-MFSD and Idiap Replay-Attack. MSU-MFSD and Idiap Replay-Attack.
O&C&M→I Training sets from Oulu-NPU, Validation sets from Oulu-NPU, Idiap Replay-Attack test set
CASIA-MFSD and MSU-MFSD. CASIA-MFSD and MSU-MFSD.
I&C&M→O Training sets from Idiap Replay-Attack, Validation sets from Idiap Replay-Attack, Oulu-NPU test set
CASIA-MFSD and MSU-MFSD. CASIA-MFSD and MSU-MFSD.
Table 7. Face anti-spoofing performance (HTER%) improvements with smaller backbone network (ResNet-18).
Model O&C&I→M O&M&I→C O&C&M→I I&C&M→O
ResNet-18 backbone 27.5 31.67 21.63 14.83
Our model (uses ResNet-18 backbone) 22.5 28.52 20.38 12.78
Table 8. Assessing the model’s generalizability on three domain generalization test sets.
Model S&O&I&R→C HTER(%) S&O&C&R→I HTER(%) S&C&I&R→O ACER(%)
ResNet-50 17.5 20.6 10.27
Our IB Network 14.0 14.7 8.05
Table 9. Comparison to the existing domain adaptation based face anti-spoofing methods on four domain adaptation test sets.
Method M→I I→M I→C C→IHTER(%) HTER(%) HTER(%) HTER(%)
Li et al. [36] 33.30 33.20 12.30 39.20
Tu et al. [60] 27.50 25.83 - -
Tu et al. [61] 25.80 23.50 23.50 21.40
Our full model 9.38 12.91 16.11 11.38
adaptation based FAS methods [36, 60, 61]. For these ex-
periments, we follow standard unsupervised domain adap-
tation training setting, i.e. the network is trained using ex-
amples from a single source domain (with ground-truth la-
bels) and unlabelled training examples from the target do-
main. To align with the domain adaptation training setup,
we use the default domain discriminator (See §4.5 & Fig.
5). The results are presented in Table 9. Out of four do-
main adaptation test sets, our proposed framework outper-
forms [36, 60, 61] on the three test sets, and shows compara-
ble results on the remaining one. These results demonstrate
that our proposed model can be exploited under both do-
main adaptation and domain generalization settings. Note
that, in this paper we are interested in the latter setting,
yet as we observe from these experimental results, our
model with small adaptations can achieve significant im-
provements for the former setting too.
Li et al. [36] have different strategies for domain adapta-
tion and we select whatever gives out the best result for their
model and compare to ours in Table 9. Li et al. [34] ap-
proach is not comparable to ours because they assume that
different domains are just different camera models, which
is quite restricting. In our case they are different datasets,
allowing us to also address changes in spoofing mediums,
illumination and background.
A.5. t-SNE Visualization of the learned CNN fea-
tures
In Section 4.4, we compared the t-SNE visualization
(See Fig. 4) of the CNN activations coming from the
ResNet-50 baseline vs our proposed model which were
trained and tested according to the domain generalization
setup - O&C&M→I (see Table 6). In Fig. 7, we present a t-
SNE visualization for the ResNet-50 vs our proposed model
trained on the remaining three domain generalization train-
ing sets - O&C&I→M, O&M&I→C and I&C&M→O (see
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Figure 7. A t-SNE Visualization of the learned CNN features coming from ResNet-50 baseline and from our proposed network.
Table 6). Each row in Fig. 7 represents a domain general-
ization train/test setup (see Table 6). The plots in the first
column (in Fig. 7) are generated using ResNet-50 baseline
model. Whereas, the plots in the second and third columns
(in Fig. 7) are generated using our proposed model. For the
sake of better visualization, however, we have deactivated
the visualization of the target domain in the second column.
Similar observations can be made as in Fig. 4. The t-
SNE plots in the second and third columns show that our
model (1) learns more discriminative features for live and
spoof images (second column); (2) aligns well the target
domains live and spoof features with the source domains’
11
Live Print attack Video replay attack
CASIA-MFSD
MSU-MFSD
Idiap Replay Attack
Oulu-NPU
Figure 8. Class activation map visualization of the proposed network. For each column i.e. live, print attack and video replay attack, the
original input images and their associated network class activation maps are shown.
live and spoof features. In contrast, the ResNet-50 features
show relatively weaker generalization ability on the target
domain, as shown in Fig. 7 (first column).
A.6. Class activation map visualization
Similar to Section 4.6, here we present some additional
class activation maps for the “live”, “print attack” and
“replay attack” samples from the four face anti-spoofing
datasets. Fig. 8 shows the class activation maps which are
generated using Grad-CAM [51]. Similar observations can
be made (as in Section 4.6) from these activation maps, i.e.
for “live” samples, the network activations are high around
the facial regions. For “print attacks”, the network acti-
vations are high in the background regions (except Oulu-
NPU), i.e. the network learns to classify print attacks by
detecting the small artifacts often appears on the surface of
the paper material (on which the face image was printed).
The high resolution print attacks of Oulu-NPU might force
the network to look at both facial regions as well as the
background. For “video replay attack”, the network tries to
gather information both from the facial regions and back-
ground. The important clues to classify a replay attack
might include the moire patterns appears in the CRT dis-
plays, the unique texture of the display screen frame etc.
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